A queueing model for last mile delivery service with noncooperative customers
Dominique Quadri
05 April 2013, 10h30 - 05 April 2013, 11h30 Salle/Bat : 475/PCRI-N
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Résumé :
We propose a queueing model for two last mile delivery services in which consumers are in competition. This work is derived from real-world e-commerce application. We study this problem via a game theoretical point of view. Indeed, the e-consumers are interacting through the last mile delivery service system as creating congestion to each other. Specifically, we focus our analysis on several equilibrium concepts from congestion/routing games: Wardrop and Logit equilibia. Those concepts are mainly related to the notion of rationality of a player in a game.
We are able to prove existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria. We compare them together trough a new metric called the Price of Ratioanlity and also we compare each one to the social optimum solution through the Price of Anarchy. Some numerical results are presented in order to illustrate different the theoretical results obtained.
